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NOTE
One Tire, One Time: The Supreme Court of
Missouri’s Expansion of Reasonable
Suspicion
State v. Smith, 595 S.W.3d 143 (Mo. 2020) (en banc).
Luke A. Hawley*

I. INTRODUCTION
All drivers are familiar with the white “fog line”1 that separates the road
from the shoulder. What Missouri drivers may not be familiar with is the fact
that they can be pulled over any time one of their tires cross that line. This
fact may surprise Missouri drivers, in part because it has only recently become
the law. While fog line infractions may seem trivial on their face, the traffic
stops that result from fog line infractions trigger significant constitutional
repercussions.
The Constitution of the United States provides that all people have
certain, fundamental freedoms, and these freedoms include protection from
unreasonable searches and seizures.2 While the Fourth Amendment has been
read to require that police officers obtain warrants before searching or seizing
personal property,3 courts have carved out exceptions to this requirement
when certain criteria are met.4 One such exception allows for police officers
to stop drivers when the officer reasonably suspects that the driver has broken
the law.5 This “reasonable suspicion” standard is often contested by criminal
defendants who argue that they should not be found guilty of their particular
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B.S. Political Science, University of Central Missouri, 2018; J.D. Candidate,
University of Missouri School of Law, 2021. I would like to thank Professor Ben
Trachtenberg for his insight during the writing of this Note, as well as the Missouri
Law Review for its help in the editing process.
1. A “fog line” is a “white line that demarcates the shoulder from the road.”
Richie v. Dir. of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Mo. 1999) (en banc).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004); State v. Pike, 162 S.W.3d
464, 472 (Mo. 2005) (en banc).
4. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)
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offense because the arresting officer was not justified in stopping them in the
first place.6
Throughout the country, criminal defendants have often succeeded in
arguing a lack of reasonable suspicion in “fog line” cases.7 Criminal
defendants and legal scholars alike reason that because state statutes typically
do not criminalize brief deviations over the fog line, police officers lack
reasonable suspicion when they base traffic stops on fog line violations alone.8
Missouri courts in particular have “consistently ruled in favor of defendants
who were stopped based on alleged fog line [sic] violations.”9 In fact,
Missouri courts have regularly held that police officers lacked the reasonable
suspicion required by the Fourth Amendment even when drivers crossed the
fog line more than once.10
In State v. Smith, the Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the trial
court’s finding that one single crossing of the “fog line” by one tire provides
sufficient probable cause for an officer to conduct a traffic stop.11 The
majority of the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that the traffic stop was justified.12 A dissent by Judge Stith argued
that the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress
evidence obtained through the traffic stop, which the dissent characterized as
unconstitutional.13 Part II of this Note examines the underlying facts of Smith.
Part III analyzes the legal background of reasonable suspicion, focusing in
particular on both the constitutional provisions relating to reasonable
suspicion and the Missouri precedent that the Supreme Court of Missouri was
bound by. Part IV discusses the Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision in
Smith. Finally, Part V argues that the majority’s opinion went against the
great weight of Missouri precedent in holding that fog line infractions are
sufficient probable cause for traffic stops.

II. FACTS AND HOLDINGS
On January 8, 2017, Sergeant Steven Johnson of the Missouri State
Highway Patrol stopped Anthony Smith on the side of Interstate 70 in

6. See Melanie D. Wilson, “You Crossed the Fog Line!” – Kansas, Pretext, and
the Fourth Amendment, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179, 1180–81 (2010); see also Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000), United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
7. Harvey Gee, “U Can’t Touch This” Fog Line: the Improper Use of Fog Line
Violation as a Pretext for Initiating an Unlawful Fourth Amendment Search and
Seizure, 36 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (2016).
8. Id. at 2–3; see, e.g., United States v. Colin, 314 F.3d 439, 444 (9th Cir. 2002).
9. Gee, supra note 7, at 3.
10. See, e.g., State v. Roark, 229 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007); State v.
Abeln, 136 S.W.3d 803, 812 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Mendoza, 75 S.W.3d 842,
845 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
11. 595 S.W.3d 143 (Mo. 2020) (en banc).
12. Id. at 144.
13. Id. at 147.
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Montgomery County, Missouri.14 According to Johnson’s testimony,
Johnson noticed Smith’s vehicle because Smith activated his turn signal,
began to change lanes, and then turned his signal off before completing the
lane change.15 While observing Smith’s vehicle, Johnson saw either both of
the passenger side tires or one of the passenger side tires cross over the “fog
line.”16 According to Johnson’s testimony, Smith’s tire crossed over the white
line on the right side of the roadway such that there was pavement between
the fog line and the tires.17 Johnson stated that the tire was “no longer within
the lane of traffic.”18 By all accounts, Smith’s passenger-side tire crossed over
the fog line one single time.19
After seeing Smith’s tire cross over the fog line, Johnson pulled Smith
over to the side of Interstate 70.20 During the traffic stop, Johnson smelled
marijuana coming from the inside of the vehicle.21 As a result, Johnson asked
Smith if he had been smoking marijuana.22 Smith responded that he had
smoked marijuana inside the vehicle during the previous week.23 Smith also
stated that there was marijuana in the vehicle.24 Johnson searched the vehicle
and found marijuana.25 Specifically, Johnson found four marijuana cigarettes
in a backpack in the passenger compartment, as well as approximately four
pounds of marijuana in Smith’s trunk.26
Smith was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance and
possession of drug paraphernalia.27 Prior to trial, Smith filed a motion to
suppress physical evidence obtained from the search of his vehicle, as well as
his own incriminating statements.28 In support of his motion, Smith argued
that “‘[m]erely crossing the fog line is insufficient probable cause to initiate a
traffic stop in Missouri, ‘[l]egally signaling an intention to change lanes
creates no reasonable suspicion or probable cause’” sufficient for detention.29

14. Id. at 148–49.
15. Id. at 144. The officer did not, however, state this as a reason for pulling
Smith over. Id.
16. Id. There was some dispute on the record between whether Sgt. Johnson saw
one or both of Smith’s tires cross over the fog line. Id. at 148.
17. Id. at 144.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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The circuit court denied Smith’s motion to suppress.30 The case
proceeded to a bench trial for one count of possession of a controlled
substance in violation of Section 579.015 of the Missouri Revised Statutes,
and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Section
579.074.31 The trial judge found Smith guilty on both counts and sentenced
him to seven years in prison for the first charge.32 The sentence was
suspended, and Smith was placed on probation for five years.33 The trial court
also imposed a $100 fine for Smith’s possession of drug paraphernalia.34
Smith appealed his conviction, claiming that the circuit court erred in
denying his motion to suppress.35 Smith argued that Sgt. Johnson’s traffic
stop was unreasonable and constituted a violation of both his Fourth
Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his Section 15
rights under the Missouri Constitution.36 Smith further argued on appeal that
all evidence against him was illegally obtained, and the fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine should have prohibited the drugs and drug paraphernalia from
being admitted.37 The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District
affirmed the trial court’s decision without filing an extended opinion stating
the principles of law applicable to the case.38 The Supreme Court of Missouri
granted transfer and affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the officer
had sufficient probable cause to stop Smith based solely on Smith’s fog line
transgression.39

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Over the years, federal and state courts have articulated various
justifications for when officers can stop a vehicle. First, this Part discusses
the Constitutions of both the United States and the State of Missouri in an
attempt to provide some background into motorists’ constitutional rights, with
special attention paid to the development of the “reasonable suspicion”
standard. Next, this Part introduces Missouri caselaw, highlighting cases from
both the Supreme Court of Missouri and the Missouri Court of Appeals that
discuss whether a vehicle crossing over the “fog line” is sufficient to justify a
traffic stop.

30. Id.
31. State v. Smith, No. ED 106830, 2019 WL 661140 (Mo. Ct. App. Feb. 19,
2019), reh’g and/or transfer denied (Mar. 26, 2019), transferred to Mo. S.Ct., 595
S.W.3d 143 (Mo. 2020), reh’g denied (Mar. 17, 2020).
32. State v. Smith, 595 S.W.3d 143, 144 (Mo. 2020) (en banc).
33. Id.
34. State v. Smith, No. ED 106830, 2019 WL 661140 at *1.
35. Smith, 595 S.W.3d at 144.
36. Id.
37. Brief for Appellant at 2, State v. Smith No. SC 97811 (Mo. 2020) (en banc).
38. State v. Smith, No. ED 106830, 2019 WL 661140 at *1.
39. Smith, 595 S.W.3d at 144.
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A. Constitutional Background and Reasonable Suspicion
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the
right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.40 The
Fourth Amendment states that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated…”41 The Fourth Amendment goes on to state
that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.”42 Section 15 of the Missouri Constitution
largely mirrors the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, also
providing that people should remain free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.43 Additionally, the Supreme Court of Missouri has held that the
same analysis applies to cases under the Missouri Constitution as cases under
the Fourth Amendment.44
Historically, the Supreme Court of the United States read the Fourth
Amendment to mean that searches without warrants should be presumed
unlawful unless the facts “unquestionably” show the government had
probable cause.45 Justice Jackson, writing for the United States Supreme
Court in Johnson v. United States, articulated the policy underlying the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of
the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn from a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any
assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s
disinterested determination to issue such a search warrant will justify
the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the
Amendment to a nullity and leave the people’s homes secure only in
the discretion of police officers. . . . When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a
judicial officer, not a policeman or a government enforcement agent.46

The Court has stated that this policy reflects the values of the framers,
noting that the authors of the Constitution fought for “a right of personal

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Id.
Id.
MO. CONST. Art. I, § 15 (2014).
See State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 570 (Mo. 1996) (en banc).
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925).
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948).
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security against the arbitrary intrusions by official power.”47 Again and again,
the Court has emphasized that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more
carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to
the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interferences of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”48
Over the decades, both the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Supreme Court of Missouri have continually reaffirmed that searches and
seizures without warrants are presumptively unlawful.49 The Court has
stressed the policy that “deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer
[should] be interposed between the citizen and the police…”50 The Court has
also stated that “[t]o hold that an officer may act in his own, unchecked
discretion upon information too vague and from too untested a source to
permit a judicial officer to accept it as probable cause for an arrest warrant,
would subvert this fundamental policy.”51
The Court has held that searches conducted outside this judicial process
are “per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment – subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”52 The exceptions to
the general rule are “jealously and carefully drawn,” and in order for a search
to qualify under one of the exceptions, “there must be a showing by those who
seek exemption […] that the exigencies of the situation made that course
imperative.”53 One such exception to the general rule involves investigatory
detentions, commonly known as Terry stops.54
In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court of the United States held for the
first time that individuals could be stopped based on an officer’s “reasonable
suspicion” rather than probable cause.55 In Terry,56 an experienced detective
was on a foot patrol when he noticed two men standing on a street corner.57
After conferring with a third man, the two took turns walking up to a store
window and peering inside.58 As a result, the officer believed the men were

47. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971).
48. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891); see also Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); Johnson v. Barnes & Noble Booksellers, Inc., 437 F.3d
1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 2006).
49. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967); see also State v. Pike,
162 S.W.3d 464, 472 (Mo. 2005) (en banc).
50. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
481–82 (1963)).
51. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 482.
52. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (emphasis added); see also Audrey Benison et al.,
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 87 GEO. L.J. 1124, 1137 (1999).
53. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971).
54. See Pike, 162 S.W.3d at 472.
55. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 5.
58. Id. at 6.
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preparing to rob the store.59 The officer approached the men, identified
himself as a patrolman, and patted down the outside of the men’s clothing.60
The officer found revolvers on two of the men, and the men were subsequently
charged with carrying concealed weapons.61 Before trial, the defense moved
to suppress the weapons, but the trial court denied the motion.62 On appeal,
the Supreme Court of the United States held that even absent probable cause,
a police officer may detain a person and conduct a limited search for weapons
if the officer reasonably believes the person being investigated is “armed and
presently dangerous to the officer or to others.”63 The Court stated that in
order to assess the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct, courts must perform
a balancing test between the public interest and the individual’s right to
personal security.64 Further, the Court said that for officers to justify such
intrusions, they must have more than a hunch.65 Rather, they “must be able
to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”66 Since Terry,
the Court has gone on to extend the reasonable-suspicion requirement to
automobile stops, among other things.67
When interpreting Terry’s reasonable-suspicion requirement, the Court
has held that because the “balance between the public interest and the
individual’s right to personal security”68 tilts in favor of a standard less than
probable cause, the Fourth Amendment’s requirements are satisfied if the stop
is supported by a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity “may be afoot.”69
Additionally, the Court has emphasized that when making reasonablesuspicion determinations, courts should look at the “totality of the
circumstances” of each case to see whether the officer had a “particularized
and objective basis” for suspecting criminal activity.70
The idea is that the reasonable-suspicion standard allows officers to draw
from their previous experiences and training to make inferences from all of
the information that is available to them.71 Although an officer’s reliance on
a mere “hunch” is not sufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood that a crime

59. Id. at 6.
60. Id. at 7.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 7–8.
63. Id. at 24.
64. Id. at 26–27.
65. Id. at 22.
66. Id. at 21.
67. See generally United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 276–77 (2002); United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 421 (1981); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727–
28 (1969); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000); United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989).
68. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
69. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30).
70. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417–18).
71. Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

7

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 1 [], Art. 10

348

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

has taken place does not need to rise to the level required of probable cause –
which would be required for an arrest – nor does it need to rise to the level of
satisfying the preponderance of the evidence standard that the government
would be held to when prosecuting a defendant.72 The Court has recognized
that the concept of reasonable suspicion is somewhat abstract; however, the
Court has purposely avoided turning the standard into “a neat set of legal
rules.”73
Similarly, Missouri courts have interpreted Terry and other United States
Supreme Court precedent to mean that police officers may conduct brief,
investigatory stops of vehicles when they have “a ‘reasonable suspicion’
based on ‘specific and articulable facts’ that illegal activity has occurred or is
occurring.”74 The question, then, is what specific and articulable facts are
sufficient for an officer to adduce that illegal activity has occurred or is
occurring.

B. Missouri Caselaw
Missouri courts have repeatedly held that “a traffic stop is not justified
where the only articulable fact offered to support the conclusion of reasonable
suspicion is that the tires of a motor vehicle crossed the fog line.”75
In State v. Mendoza, the defendant was driving on the interstate when
she passed a Missouri State Highway Patrol sergeant parked on the shoulder
of the road.76 The officer observed the defendant driving in the left-hand
passing lane despite there being no cars in the right-hand lane.77 As the
defendant drove past where the officer was parked, the defendant’s driver’sside tires “ran onto the yellow line of the shoulder.”78 The officer followed
the defendant for two miles before initiating a traffic stop.79 The sergeant’s
traffic stop and subsequent canine search of the defendant’s vehicle yielded
111 pounds of marijuana.80 Mendoza, the defendant, was charged with
possession of marijuana and drug trafficking.81 Mendoza filed a motion to
suppress evidence, and the trial judge denied her motion.82 Mendoza was
convicted on both counts and appealed her conviction, claiming that the stop

72. Id. at 274; see also Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7.
73. Ornelas v. United States, 517, U.S. 690, 695–96 (1996).
74. State v. Pike, 162 S.W.3d 464, 472 (Mo. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1967)).
75. State v. Beck, 436 S.W.3d 566, 568 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (citing State v.
Roark, 229 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007)).
76. 75 S.W.3d 842, 843–44 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
77. Id. at 844.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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had been pretextual.83 The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern
District reversed Mendoza’s conviction, holding that despite the officer’s
observation that her tires had traveled onto the fog line, there was no
justification for the officer to stop the defendant.84
In State v. Abeln, a state trooper was driving west on four-lane Highway
36 when he received a call from dispatch indicating that someone in a tan
Carhartt coat had seemed suspicious when purchasing starter fluid at the local
Orscheln Farm & Home store.85 The call from dispatch indicated that the
suspect had driven off in a burgundy pickup truck and had purchased funnels
and hoses earlier in the week.86 The trooper testified that moments later, a
burgundy pickup truck passed in the eastbound lanes of Highway 36.87 The
trooper claimed that he could see the driver was wearing a tan Carhartt coat.88
The trooper made a U-turn across the median so that he could follow the
burgundy truck; however, the highway changed from four lanes to two lanes,
and there was a vehicle between the trooper and the burgundy truck.89 The
trooper testified that he saw the driver, Abeln, reach toward the glove box in
a suspicious manner.90 Then, the trooper “observed on [two] occasions […]
that the passenger side tires of the truck traveled over what is commonly
referred to as the fog line.”91 The trooper subsequently made a traffic stop
and found evidence that Abeln was attempting to produce a controlled
substance with the intent to distribute.92 Abeln filed a motion to suppress,
claiming that the stop had been improper and violated his Fourth Amendment
right to protection against unreasonable seizure.93 The trial court sustained
Abeln’s motion and the state appealed that order.94 The Missouri Court of
Appeals for the Western District upheld the trial court’s granting of Abeln’s
motion.95 The appellate court found that Abeln’s purchase of starter fluid,
83. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 275 F.3d 673, 680 (8th Cir. 2001).
84. Mendoza, 75 S.W.3d at 846.
85. State v. Abeln, 136 S.W.3d 803, 807 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). Starter fluid is
commonly used in production methamphetamine. Keegan Hamilton, Methology 101:
Old-school meth labs give way to “shake and bake”, RIVERFRONT TIMES, (May 29,
2010),
https://www.riverfronttimes.com/stlouis/methology-101-old-school-methlabs-give-way-to-shake-and-bake/Content?oid=2483461 [https://perma.cc/KAU7WE6A].
86. Abeln, 136 S.W.3d at 807.Funnels and tubes of this nature are commonly
used in the production methamphetamine. Hamilton, supra note 85.
87. Abeln, 136 S.W.3d at 807.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. Based on information that Abeln was involved in the local
methamphetamine trade, the officer believed the items Abeln had purchased were
likely going to be used to produce methamphetamine. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 814.
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along with his previous purchases of hoses and funnels, did not give the
trooper reasonable suspicion that Abeln was involved in criminal activity.96
The court went on to say that the fact Abeln had reached into his glove box
while driving and crossed the fog line twice did “not add enough to the
equation to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.”97
In State v. Roark, a state trooper received a call from dispatch that a
possibly intoxicated driver had been driving on Highway 50 toward Sedalia.98
The report included a vehicle description and license plate number that
matched the defendant’s vehicle.99 The trooper positioned his vehicle so that
he could see Roark’s vehicle approach.100 After Roark passed the trooper, the
trooper pulled into the heavy traffic on Highway 50 some distance behind
Roark’s vehicle.101 At trial, the state trooper testified that the passenger-side
tires of the Roark’s vehicle crossed the fog line twice.102 The trooper stated
that the tires crossed onto the paved shoulder of the road, but none of the
surrounding traffic was forced to take evasive action.103 Roark subsequently
pulled into a hotel and parked his vehicle.104 Roark entered the hotel, and the
state trooper followed Roark inside.105 The trooper found Roark at the hotel
bar and explained that dispatch had received a call about a drunk driver.106
The trooper asked Roark to come outside because the officer “needed to
conduct an investigation to determine if he was, indeed, intoxicated.”107 Once
outside, the trooper conducted field sobriety tests and placed Roark under
arrest.108 The trial court overruled Roark’s motion to suppress, and he was
subsequently convicted.109 Roark appealed, arguing the trooper lacked
probable cause and the necessary reasonable suspicion for an investigatory
stop.110
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District
acknowledged that the only articulable fact offered to support the trooper’s
reasonable suspicion was the transgression of Roark’s tires over the fog
line.111 The court held that the trooper was not “aware of articulable facts that

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 812.
Id.
State v. Roark, 229 S.W.3d 216, 217 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 217–18.
Id. at 218.
Id.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 220.
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would ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that an offense had
been committed.”112
In State v. Beck, the defendant was headed west on a state highway as a
police officer was headed east on the same road.113 The officer noticed that
the defendant’s pickup truck was driving over the fog line that separated the
shoulder of the road from the driving lane.114 The officer turned around,
caught up with the defendant, and stopped the defendant’s car.115 Beck was
subsequently arrested for driving while intoxicated.116 Prior to trial, the
defendant filed a motion to suppress arguing that the mere touching or
crossing of a fog line cannot justify a traffic stop.117 The trial court granted
the motion to suppress, and the state appealed.118 The Missouri Court of
Appeals for the Southern District affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant
the motion to suppress.119 In support of its decision, the Southern District in
Beck cited to State v. Roark,120 State v. Abeln,121 and State v. Mendoza.122 The
court stated that because the officer had observed only “mere touching or
crossing the fog line,” and because previous Missouri precedent has
continually said that the mere crossing of the fog line is insufficient for
establishing reasonable suspicion, the trial court did not err.123
These Missouri appellate court cases illustrate one central rule: the
momentary transgression of a vehicle over the fog line, even when coupled
with other suspicious behavior, is insufficient to establish the necessary
reasonable suspicion to stop a Missouri driver. However, the Supreme Court
of Missouri had not ruled on the issue until it heard State v. Smith.

IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Supreme Court of Missouri was tasked with determining whether
the mere deviation of one tire over the fog line could justify a traffic stop.124
The court reasoned that if the police officer did have reasonable suspicion to
believe Smith had committed a traffic violation, the traffic stop would be
justifiable under the Fourth Amendment and the subsequent discovery of
marijuana would not be subject to exclusion.125 Therefore, the court’s
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 222 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964)).
State v. Beck, 436 S.W. 3d 566, 568 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 569.
229 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
136 S.W.3d 803, 812 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
75 S.W.3d 842, 845 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
Beck, 436 S.W. 3d at 568.
Id. (quoting Nardone v. United State, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).
Id. at 145–46.
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analysis hinged on whether crossing the fog line and driving momentarily on
the shoulder constitutes a violation of Missouri law.126

A. The Principal Opinion
To determine whether crossing the fog line violates Missouri law, the
court turned to Section 304.015 of the Missouri Revised Statutes.127 Smith’s
argument was that “[m]erely touching or crossing the fog line does not give
reasonable suspicion that any crime or traffic offense has occurred.”128 The
State, on the other hand, contended that crossing the fog line and driving on
the shoulder – however briefly – is a violation of Section 304.015.129 The
court was tasked with determining whether “crossing the fog line and driving
on the shoulder contravenes [Section 304.015] and constitutes a traffic
violation.”130 In doing so, the court acknowledged that its task was one of
statutory interpretation.131
The court noted that “the goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect
to the [state legislature’s] intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute
at issue.”132 Section 304.015.2 states that “upon all public roads or highways
of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the
roadway[.]”133 Section 304.001(12) defines “roadway” as “that portion of a
state highway ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the berm or
shoulder.”134 The “fog line” is the “white line that demarcates the shoulder
from the road.”135
However, Section 304 of the Missouri Revised Statutes does not provide
a definition of the word “drive.”136 When a term is not defined in a statute,
the court must give the term its “plain and ordinary meaning as derived from
the dictionary.”137 In analyzing this case, the court looked to Webster’s
dictionary, which defines the verb “drive” as “to operate the mechanism and
controls and direct the course of” a motor vehicle.138 Subsequently, the court
reasoned that operating and directing the course of a vehicle on the shoulder

126. Id. at 146.
127. Id.; see MO. REV. STAT. § 304.015 (2018).
128. Smith, 595 S.W.3d at 146.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (quoting State v. Jones, 479 S.W.3d 100, 106 (Mo. 2016) (en banc)).
133. Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 304.015).
134. Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 304.001.12).
135. Id. (quoting Riche v. Dir. Of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Mo. 1999) (en
banc)).
136. Id.
137. Id. (quoting Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Union Elec. Co., 552 S.W.3d 532,
541 (Mo. 2018) (en banc)).
138. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 692 (3d ed. 2002)).
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by allowing it to cross over the fog line is a violation of Section 304.015.2.139
Because Section 304.015.9 states that a violation of Section 304.015 is a class
C misdemeanor, the court held that the momentary crossing of the fog line is
not just a traffic violation, but a crime for which drivers can be jailed for
fifteen days, fined $750, or both.140 As a result of this interpretation, the court
held that the mere crossing of a fog line is a violation of the law sufficient to
justify a traffic stop.141
In applying Section 304.015 to the facts of this case, the court held that
Smith’s crossing of the fog line and thereby “operating and directing the
course of his vehicle on the shoulder” was a violation of Missouri law.142
Because Smith had violated the law, the court avoided reasonable suspicion
analysis and held that there was actual probable cause for the officer to stop
Smith.143 As a result, the court concluded that the stop in this case did not
constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and the
circuit court did not err in denying Smith’s motion to suppress.144

B. The Dissenting Opinion
Judge Laura Denvir Stith dissented, arguing that the principal opinion
was incorrect in finding that one tire momentarily crossing the fog line gave
probable cause to believe Smith had violated Section 304.015.2.145 Judge
Stith first addressed the statutory interpretation, arguing that Section 304.015
does not state that one tire crossing the fog line is a traffic violation; rather, it
provides that cars must be driven “upon the right half of the roadway.”146
Judge Stith wrote that the majority opinion cited no authority in support of the
idea that one momentary crossing of the fog line by a vehicle’s tire constitutes
a failure to “‘drive’ on the right half of the roadway.”147 While the majority
relied on a dictionary definition of drive – “‘to operate the mechanism and
controls and direct the course of’ a motor vehicle” – Judge Stith argued that
this definition merely raises the question as to what constitutes “operation” or
“direction.”148
Judge Stith also made a notice argument.149 Judge Stith pointed out that
the law only requires drivers to drive on the roadway, as close as practicable
to the right hand of the road, but this definition fails to provide Missouri
drivers with notice that if any “particular part of the vehicle goes over the fog
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 147–48 (Stith, J., dissenting).
Id. at 148.
Id.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 149–50.
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line, no matter how insignificantly, then even though the remainder is in the
right-hand lane, the driver would be guilty of directing the course of his or her
vehicle off the roadway.”150 Judge Stith also suggested that if the legislature
had intended the statute to read this way, the legislature simply could have
made it do so explicitly.151
In addition to the statutory interpretation analysis, Judge Stith also
addressed Missouri precedent.152 Judge Stith highlighted that Missouri courts
have continually held that such a minor deviation of a tire crossing onto the
shoulder for a moment does not constitute a traffic offense.153 Judge Stith
summarized the principal opinion as follows:
No authority is cited that one momentary crossing of the fog line by a
vehicle’s tires (if such a crossing even occurred here) constitutes
failing to “drive” on the right half of the roadway. To the contrary,
prior cases from this Court assume, and prior cases of the court of
appeals and other jurisdictions hold, that such minor deviations of a
tire onto the shoulder do not constitute a traffic offense. This Court
should also so hold.154

Judge Stith noted that Missouri courts have been using a well-established
rule that “traffic laws ‘are not unyielding and inflexible and are not to be
applied rigidly, absolutely and peremptorily without regard to circumstances
or conditions there existing.’”155 Rather, Judge Stith noted that Missouri law
is well settled that courts should interpret statutes in a way that is not hypertechnical, but instead based on reason and logic.156 If the court examined this
case in such a manner, and had not rigidly read the term “drive” to include a
tire briefly touching a surface, Judge Stith argued the principal opinion would
have found that a momentary transgression of a tire over a fog line is not a
specific and articulable reason sufficient for reasonable suspicion.157

V. COMMENT
The precedent established by the Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision
in Smith leaves Missouri drivers vulnerable to unfettered police and
prosecutorial discretion. By allowing police officers to conduct traffic stops
based solely on the observation that one tire of a vehicle momentarily crossed

150. Id.
151. Id. at 150.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 148.
155. Id. at 150 (quoting Leonard v. Gordon’s Transp., Inc., 575 S.W.2d 244, 249
(Mo. Ct. App. 1978)).
156. Id. (citing Fred Weber, Inc. v. Dir. Of Revenue, 452 S.W.3d 628, 630 (Mo.
2015) (en banc)).
157. Id. at 154.
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the fog line, the court overturns decades of Missouri precedent and degrades
the constitutional protections of drivers in the process. The principal opinion’s
holding that the single, momentary crossing of the fog line by one tire of a
vehicle constitutes a violation of Missouri law sufficient for constitutionally
required reasonable suspicion is unsound because it (a) misinterprets the
applicable Missouri statute, (b) fails to account for Missouri court precedent,
and (c) creates bad law.

A. Statutory Interpretation
Missouri law does not state that the momentary crossing of the fog line
by one of a vehicle’s tires is a violation of the law. As a result of this statutory
absence, the majority opinion pieces together different Missouri statutes and
external definitions in an attempt to judicially create a new traffic violation.
Section 304.015 of the Missouri Revised Statutes states plainly that
“upon all public roads or highways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven
on the right half of the roadway[.]”158 Because this statute lacks significant
detail, the court turned to external sources to interpret the words “drive” and
“roadway.”159 Section 304.001(12) defines “roadway” as “that portion of a
state highway ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the berm or
shoulder.”160 Because this chapter of the Missouri statutes fails to define the
word “drive,” the court turned to a dictionary, which provided that to drive
means to “‘operate the mechanism and controls and direct the course of’ a
motor vehicle.”161 After piecing together these definitions, the court
concluded that Section 304.015 requires Missouri drivers to never cross the
fog line with any portion of their vehicle for any period of time.162 The court
concluded that if any part of any vehicle does cross over this fog line for any
period of time, then the driver is in violation of Section 304.015, is guilty of
a class C misdemeanor, can be justifiably stopped by police officers, and can
be subsequently jailed and fined.163
Judge Stith’s dissent pointed out the substantial flaws in this logic,
calling into question the statutory interpretation upon which the majority’s
conclusion is based:
The principal opinion focuses on the word “roadway” and correctly
notes that section 304.001(12) defines “roadway” as “that portion of a
state highway ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the
berm or shoulder.” Therefore, the statute requires a car to be driven on
the roadway, not the shoulder. But that merely begs the question at

158. MO. REV. STAT § 304.015 (2018).
159. Smith, 595 S.W.3d at 146.
160. § 304.001(12).
161. Smith, 595 S.W.3d at 146 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 692
(3d ed. 2002)).
162. Id.
163. Id.
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issue here – whether Mr. Smith was “driving” on the shoulder merely
because one or two of his tires allegedly inadvertently crossed over the
fog line for an instant.164

Judge Stith argued that the majority’s reliance upon Webster’s definition
of “drive” fails to adequately answer this question, stating that “[t]his
definition […] begs the question as to what constitutes operating or directing
the course of a motor vehicle off the roadway.”165 Judge Stith’s argument
essentially comes down to the idea that a momentary crossing of the fog line
by any part of a vehicle for any period of time cannot be considered “operating
or directing” the motor vehicle off of the road.
The majority opinion was wrong in stating that the mere momentary drift
of any part of a vehicle over the fog line constitutes “driving.” If a tire, for
one split second, goes over the fog line, that can hardly be considered
“operating or directing” the motor vehicle off of the road. Holding differently
goes against a typical Missourian’s understanding of the word “drive,” as well
as the intent of the legislature that drafted these applicable statutes. If the
legislature had intended for such minor deviations over the fog line to
constitute a violation of Missouri law, it could have crafted the applicable
statutes in a manner that makes that requirement clear. Piecing together
different statutory provisions with different external definitions is a means of
circumventing the legislative intent, holding without basis that the mere
drifting of one tire over a line somehow constitutes the operation of a vehicle
off a road.
The majority’s interpretation of Section 304.015 is also inconsistent with
the common understanding of Missouri traffic laws.166 Normal Missouri
drivers occasionally cross over fog lines while driving. No one is a perfect
driver, so it makes sense that occasional momentary transgressions will
happen. That is the very reason that lines and rumble strips are there in the
first place – to warn drivers when they have momentarily drifted too far.
Should the momentary drifting of even one tire across a fog line, however
brief, constitute a violation of Missouri law sufficient to allow police officers
to pull drivers over, search their vehicles, and put them in jail? A normal
Missouri driver would answer “no,” and because the legislative intent would
seem to agree, the Supreme Court of Missouri was wrong to hold otherwise.

B. Missouri Precedent
Decisions by lower Missouri courts have interpreted Section 304.015 in
a manner more consistent with the clear legislative intent and the general
understanding of the driving public. Missouri courts have long held that the
mere momentary crossing of one tire over a fog line, even in conjunction with
other suspicious behavior, is an insufficient basis for reasonable suspicion.
164. Id. at 149.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 150 (Stith, J., dissenting).
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This is because merely crossing the fog line is not an explicit violation of
Missouri law. This repeated lower court interpretation makes sense because
the Missouri Revised Statutes do not criminalize such behavior, as discussed
above.
While the Supreme Court of Missouri is certainly not bound by the
Missouri Court of Appeals, it should have taken the lower courts’ opinions –
based on plain meaning and sound interpretations of the legislative intent –
into account when deciding Smith. However, the majority’s holding in Smith
effectively ignored this Missouri precedent without giving a reason for doing
so. This refusal to address previous Missouri cases led the court to baselessly
hold that the momentary transgression of one tire over a fog line is sufficient
for reasonable suspicion. To protect the constitutional rights of Missouri
drivers, the Supreme Court of Missouri should not have made such a deviation
from Missouri precedent.
Based on a review of both the majority and the dissenting opinions, as
well as analysis of the Missouri precedent cited by Judge Stith, the majority’s
holding in Smith is against the great weight of Missouri precedent. Missouri
cases have continually held the brief crossing of the fog line does not violate
any Missouri statute. On the contrary, lower Missouri appellate courts have
repeatedly held that the crossing of a fog line more than once, even in
conjunction with other suspicious behavior, does not rise to the level of
reasonable suspicion required for investigatory stops. Holding to the contrary
is completely illogical based on the definitions provided by the majority in
support of their decision. The Supreme Court of Missouri’s holding in Smith
reduces the constitutional rights guaranteed to all Missouri drivers. As such,
Judge Stith’s argument should have prevailed in holding that the momentary
transgression of one tire over the fog line is insufficient as the basis for
reasonable suspicion required to initiate a traffic stop.

C. Creation of Bad Law
In ignoring the legislative intent and applicable precedent, the principal
opinion in Smith created bad law. The principal opinion created a new rule
allowing for Missouri drivers to be stopped, searched, fined, and jailed simply
because they let one of their tires briefly cross over the fog line. This rule is
bad on its merits and will undoubtedly be a shock to any driver against whom
it is used.
It is ridiculous to hold that any person who lets one of their tires briefly
cross the fog line can be jailed for doing so, and while prosecutors may not
actually fine or jail defendants for crossing the fog line, that is exactly what
the Supreme Court of Missouri has allowed. Are we to believe that those who
let their cars drift a few inches too far should be put in jail to rehabilitate from
their illegal activity? Are we to believe that those who cross over the fog line
are so dangerous that they should be locked up to keep the rest of us safe? Of
course not. Such a rule clearly goes against logic and reason and has no place
in Missouri law. Drivers sometimes cross the fog line, and a rule that allows
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the criminal justice system to use unfettered discretion in stopping, searching,
fining, and jailing them for doing so is appalling.

VI. CONCLUSION
In State v. Smith, the Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the trial court’s
decision to deny Smith’s motion to suppress evidence of his stop, holding that
the momentary crossing Smith’s tire over the fog line constituted a violation
of Missouri law sufficient for a showing of reasonable suspicion. The court’s
decision goes against the great weight of Missouri case precedent. As a result,
the court’s decision sets a new standard – one that allows police officers to
conduct traffic stops, search vehicles, and put people in jail any time they
allege to have seen a tire cross across a fog line. This precedent substantially
damages Missouri drivers’ fundamental freedoms provided by the
Constitution of the United States, and it sets a dangerous standard for cases to
come.
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